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Abstract
This study evaluates potential reforms of the EU and some liberalization policies under the Doha
agenda proposal.  Results indicate that EU sugar policy reforms will increase the Caribbean
sugar price from 8.7 to 9.96 cents, but will not affect the U.S. sugar industry.  If the world sugar
industry is liberalized on the basis of the WTO-Doha framework proposal, U.S. sugar imports
will increase to 1.9 million tons and wholesale price will decrease from 24.89 to 23.79 cents per
pound.  Under this scenario, it is also expected that the Caribbean price will increase from 8.7 to
12.1 cents per pound.  Brazil will benefit the most as production and export sales increase.
Keywords: sugar, liberalization, production, price, EU reform, Dohaiv
Highlights
In 2004, the European Union (EU) proposed reforms in which a significant price cut and a
reduction in the production quota were incorporated.  Additionally, under the Doha Development
Agenda, substantial improvement in market access is being discussed for all agricultural
products, including sugar.  This study evaluates the impact of potential trade liberalization
policies on U.S. producers and consumers and implications for the world sugar market.
If the recently proposed reforms in the EU sugar program are implemented, U.S. beet and cane
sugar production will increase, but at marginal levels.  Also, we expect marginal increments in
consumption and no change in net imports.  Sugar beets, sugar cane, and wholesale sugar prices
in the United States are projected to decrease by 1 percent.  In contrast, the Caribbean price is
expected to increase from 8.7 cents to 9.96 cents per pound, which represents a 14.5 percent
increase compared to the base-line scenario.
Under the Doha scenario, our model simulates the EU changes, plus a 20 percent reduction in
sugar import tariffs and a 20 percent increase in import quotas in China, Japan, and the United
States.  Results indicate that beet and cane sugar production in the United States are expected to
decrease by only 1.0 and 0.8 percent, respectively, and total consumption is expected to increase
by 0.9 percent.  Freer trade policies will increase U.S. imports to 1.9 million tons, which
represents a 15.3 percent increase.  Prices are expected to decrease to 38.96 (3.4 percent) and
26.43 dollars per ton (4.7 percent) for sugar beets and sugar cane, respectively.  In addition,
wholesale sugar price in the United States is expected to decrease by 4.4 percent to 23.79 cents
per pound.  By contrast, the world sugar price is projected to increase by 39 percent to 12.1 cents
per pound, 3.4 cents higher than the base scenario.  Implementation of this scenario may increase
social welfare in the United States, but because of reduced prices, the policy may affect sugar
producers in the United States.
With higher Caribbean price under the Doha scenario, Brazil will benefit most, as production
and export sales increase, followed by Thailand and Australia.  The EU, India, and China are
expected to increase imports substantially.  The United States and Japan will increase imports
moderately.*Research Assistant Professor, Research Scientist, and Professor and Director, respectively, in the
Center for Agricultural Policy and Trade Studies, North Dakota State University, Fargo.
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INTRODUCTION
Many producing countries in the world provide protection to their sugar industries using direct
or indirect support instruments.  However, regional and multinational free trade agreements are
creating pressure for sugar producing countries to reform their sugar policies.  For instance, in
April 2005, the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled on the appeal of a dispute brought by
Australia, Brazil, and Thailand against the EU sugar regime.  The panel concluded that the EU
had been exporting more sugar under export subsidies than is permitted in the WTO agreement. 
As a result of this decision, the EU will be required to substantially reduce its expenditure in
sugar support programs and adopt policies that are in line with the recommendations from the
WTO panel.
In July 2004, independent of the WTO-panel’s decision, the EU proposed a reform schedule that
is expected to be published in some form in June 2005.  The changes are oriented to increase
competitiveness and will frame the EU sugar position for the WTO-Doha Development Agenda
(DDA) negotiations in Hong Kong in December 2005.  Also, under the current WTO-DDA,
member countries are negotiating substantial improvements in market access which will be
applied to all agricultural commodities, including sugar.
The future of the U.S. and the world sugar industries is uncertain under these potential policy
changes (Kelch and Normile, 2004; Roney, 2004).  Therefore, it is important to study the impact
trade liberalization will have on U.S. producers and consumers and the implications for the
world sugar market.
Previous research has evaluated the effect of trade liberalization policies on the sugar industry in
the United States and world markets (Koo, 2002; Beghin et al., 2001; Haley, 2000; U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2000; Borrell and Pierce, 1999).  These studies have reported an increase in
world sugar price when major sugar markets move toward freer trade policies.  Borrell and
Pierce (1999) and Koo (2002) found that if the EU and the United States liberalize their sugar
industries, it will cause the world price to increase by 68 and 20 percent, respectively.  However,
if only the United States liberalizes its sugar industry, world price will increase by 33 percent
and the U.S. wholesale sugar price will decrease by 20 percent.  Haley (2000) found that, under a
free trade scenario, U.S. wholesale sugar price would decrease 13 percent.
In terms of social benefits, studies found that reduced sugar prices in the United States would
create an increase in consumer surplus and a reduction of producer surplus (Koo, 2002; U.S.
General Accounting Office, 2000).
The objectives of this paper are to evaluate the potential effect of the recently proposed sugar
policy structural changes in the EU and the currently proposed changes under WTO-Doha2
negotiations.  The global sugar policy simulation model developed by Benirschka et al. (1996)
was used for the analysis of alternative scenarios.  The following section presents a description
of sugar policies, production, and consumption trends in selected countries.  In section 2, the
sugar model and alternative scenarios are discussed.  Section 3 includes results of the simulation
model, and the final section summarizes the results.
SUGAR POLICIES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
China
In China, the government provides price incentives for producers and controls imports and
stocks to maintain high internal sugar prices (Economic Research Service (ERS) - U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), 2003).  In 2004, the tariff rate quota was set at 1.8 million
metric tons (MT), with a tariff rate of 20 percent within the quota and 27 percent for over quota
imports.  This represents a 65 percent reduction from the 2001 over quota tariff (Mitchell, 2004;
ERS-USDA, 2003).  Although strong competition exists between sugar and artificial sweeteners,
total sugar production has doubled since 1989 (from 5.6 million MT to 11.2 million MT in
2004).  Despite increased production, Chinese imports of sugar have grown by 6 percent from
1989 (1.1 million MT) to 2004 (1.2 million MT).  Domestic consumption of sugar has increased
by 64 percent, rising from 7.5 million MT in 1989 to 12.2 million MT in 2004.  As a result,
exports of sugar from China declined from 624,000 MT in 1989 to 50,000 MT in 2004, a drop of
92 percent (ERS-USDA, PS&D Tables).
European Union (EU)
The EU sugar program started in 1965 as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), with
no major amendments since its inclusion.  The program is primarily financed by EU consumers,
who pay a higher sugar price than the world market price.  The last version of the sugar policy
was completed in 1995, which extended its validity until the 2000/2001 marketing year.  The
CAP provides protection for the sugar industry through guaranteed intervention and minimum
prices, production quotas, import controls, and export subsidies (ERS-USDA, 2003).  Other
safeguards are applied for sugar used in the production of alcohol and yeast, and for isoglucose
and inuline syrup.  As a result, the domestic wholesale price of refined sugar is about
300 percent higher than the world price (Roney, 2004).
The intervention price is a mechanism by which agencies are committed to purchase eligible
sugar at a minimum price, which has been constant since 1993 at € 631.90 (780 U.S. dollars) and
€ 523.70 (646.5 U.S. dollars) per metric ton of refined and raw sugar, respectively (European
Commission, 2004 (b); Mitchell, 2004).  EU policy has also established minimum prices at
which sugar processors are required to buy from beet growers.  The prices, unchanged since
1992, are set at  € 46.72 (57.7 U.S. dollars) and  € 32.42 (40.0 U.S. dollars) per metric ton for
beets used to produce A-quota sugar (82 percent) and B-quota sugar (18 percent), respectively. 
The difference between the two quotas is mainly the amount of levies applied to each of them.  
During the period 2003-2004, the total production quota was about 17.4 million MT (EU-25). 
This was divided into the 14.7 million MT A-quota, in which the outlet is guaranteed and the
guarantee price may be reduced up to 2 percent for the production levies, and the 2.7 million MT3
B-quota, of which the outlet is also guaranteed but at a price which can be decreased up to
39.5 percent for levies.  C-quota sugar, which must be exported with no subsidy or stored and
used as part of the following year’s A and B quotas, varies from year to year at about 3.0 million
MT.  Production quotas are also established for isoglucose (0.5 million tons) and inulin syrup
(0.3 million tons) (ERS-USDA, 2004).
Imports are restricted by the implementation of two tariffs, one fixed and the other depending on
the volatility of the world market price of sugar.  The fixed duty is established at € 419 (517 U.S.
dollars) and € 339 (419 U.S. dollars) per metric ton of refined and raw sugar, respectively. 
During 2004, sugar imports carried an average total import tariff level of about € 700 (864 U.S.
dollars) per metric ton (ERS-USDA, 2004).
Special access to the EU sugar market has been given to 46 countries from Africa, the
Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), as well as to India.  These countries can export sugar to the
EU at internal prices.  The total import agreement was set at 1.3 million MT in 1975.  In 1995,
another import allocation (200,000 to 350,000 MT) was made to ACP countries.  Additionally,
the EU took over import commitments from new member-states in 1995, totaling 85,500 MT. 
Also, 100,000 MT were temporarily granted to several countries in the Balkans in 2001/02
(Mitchell, 2004).
In July 2004, the EU proposed new reforms in its sugar policy which follow the basic principles
of reforms implemented in 2003, and are expected to go into effect, in some form, in 2005
(Kelch and Normile, 2004; European Commission , 2004 (a)).
The reforms include the following:
1.  A cut in the intervention price (renamed “reference price”) of refined sugar from
€ 632 to € 421 (780 to 520 U.S. dollars) per MT.  Also, the proposal reduces the tariff
protection to € 421 per metric ton, which is at the same level as the proposed reference
price.
2.  Reduction of sugar beet price from € 32.8 to € 27.4 (40.5 to 33.8 U.S. dollars)
per MT.
3.  Production quota reduction from 17.4 million MT to 14.6 million.  The proposal
applies to A-sugar only, and the other categories are no longer considered.  Additionally,
the production quota of isoglucose is increased from 0.5 to 0.8 million MT.
4.  New member countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are compensated as old members in
terms of sugar support programs.
5.  Introduction of decoupled payments to sugar farmers in the form of Single Farm
Payments (SFP) to compensate 60 percent of lost revenue due to price and quota
reductions.  SFP will be granted to farmers who grew sugar beets during the reference
period (2000-2002) and will not be affected by any subsequently quota transfers.4
6.  Sugar imports from the ACP and India will remain at 1.3 million MT; however, the
price is reduced from € 421 to € 329 (519.8 to 406.2 U.S. dollars) per MT.
If the EU is able to pass such reforms, production and exports would be substantially reduced,
potentially increasing world sugar prices (Kelch and Normile, 2004; European Commission,
2004 (a)).  According to the EU Commission, reduction of export subsidies and decoupling aid
from sugar beet producers will increase domestic sugar imports from developing countries.  By
contrast, reports from the American Sugar Alliance (ASA) have concluded that because of the
diminished role of the EU in the world sugar market, the proposed sugar policy reform will not
be an important factor in world sugar prices and in the U.S. sugar industry.  According to the
ASA, the proposed sugar policy will not preclude large volumes of sugar exports from the EU,
and the proposed price reduction would still leave domestic wholesale sugar prices above U.S.
price levels.
The EU has an important place in the world sugar market.  In terms of the world trade share, the
EU accounts for about 14 percent of production, 13 percent of consumption, 12 percent of
exports, and 5 percent of imports.  With the recent enlargement of the organization, EU-25,
production is expected to be between 19-20 million MT.  Sugar is produced from sugar cane
(2 percent) and beets (98 percent) in almost all member states, with the exception of
Luxembourg, Estonia, Cyprus, and Malta.  Major producing states are France and Germany, with
about 50 percent of total production, followed by Poland, Italy, and the United Kingdom
(European Commission, 2004 (b)).
For the EU-15 member countries, both production and domestic use have significantly increased
over time (ERS-USDA, PS&D Tables).  Total sugar production and consumption in 1961 was
6.3 and 5.5 million MT, respectively; in 2004, production and consumption totaled 16.5 and
14.4 million MT.  Despite this significant change from the 1960s levels, production has
remained relatively stable since 1992 and domestic consumption has been almost constant since
the beginning of the 1990s (Figure 1).  From 1961 to 1981, total exports of refined sugar
increased (Figure 2).  From 1981 to 2003, exports have varied between 5 and 7 million MT, and
in 2004, total exports were 4.6 million MT.  Exports have exceeded imports since 1977.  Imports
increased substantially from 1961 to 1974; since 1978, they have been relatively stable and
significantly below the volume of sugar exports (Figure 2).  Total imports, mostly in raw sugar,
were 2.1 million MT in 2004.  In general, the EU is a net exporter; however, because of the
difference between the high price paid for imports relative to the low price received for exports,
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Figure 2. Total Sugar Imports and Exports by the EU (1960-2004)6
Japan
The Japanese government protects its country’s sugar industry by implementing minimum prices
for sugar beets and cane, controls on raw sugar imports, prohibitive duties on refined sugar
imports, and tariffs and quotas on products containing sugar and sugar substitutes.  Also, the
government regulates the production and price of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) in order to
limit competition with sugar producers (Mitchell, 2004; ERS-USDA, 2003).
During the period 1989-2004, total sugar production in Japan declined by 14 percent, mainly due
to a reduction in the production of sugar cane (53 percent).  Total production in 1989 was
988,000 MT, while in 2004, production declined to 850,000 MT.  Sugar imports also have
declined from 1.8 million MT, in 1989, to 1.5 million MT in 2004, which represents a decline of
about 18 percent.  Exports of refined sugar increased from 2,000 MT in 1989 to 10,000 MT in
2000 and have remained at this level until 2004.  Domestic consumption of sugar has decreased
by 19 percent from 1989 (2.8 million MT) to 2004 (2.3 million MT) (ERS-USDA, PS&D
Tables).
United States
The two main elements of U.S. sugar policy are the price support loan program and the Tariff-
Rate Quota (TRQ) import system.  Additionally, the United States has international sugar trade
agreements, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The United States
also operates the Refined Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products Re-Export Programs to allow
U.S. participants to buy sugar at world prices for use in products that will be exported in the
world market (ERS-USDA, 2005; Mitchell, 2004).
The current 2002 Farm Act allows the USDA to make loans available to processors of 18 cents
per pound of domestically grown sugarcane and 22.9 cents per pound of domestically grown
sugar beets.  The Farm Act also requires the USDA to continue operating the program at no cost
to the federal government.  To meet this objective, the Payment in Kind program (PIK) has been
continued to reduce inventories.  The program allows producers to bid for the amount of
inventory they would accept in exchange for not harvesting planted acreage.  Another
mechanism of control through the USDA is the use of allotments to avoid forfeitures.  The
allotments are implemented only when sugar imports are less than 1.532 million short tons raw
value (STRV).  The overall allotment for FY 2005 was set at 8.1 billion STRV (ERS-USDA,
2005).  Also, the current Act terminated the forfeiture penalty on cane and beet processors and
reduced interest rates on sugar loans by one percentage point.
In the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the United States
agreed to a minimum import quantity of 1.256 million STRV of raw and refined sugar (ERS-
USDA, 2005).  Under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), additional sugar
imports were allocated to Mexico since 1994.  During the first six years of NAFTA, Mexico had
duty-free access for sugar exports to the United States in the amount of its net surplus
production, up to a maximum of 25,000 MT.  If the country was not a surplus producer for two
years, duty-free access was limited to 7,258 MT.  After the seventh year, the limit of the duty-
free access was 150,000 MT, increasing 10 percent until free access in 2008 (ERS-USDA,
2005).  However, Mexican sugar access to the U.S. market continues to be under dispute.  The7
closing negotiations of NAFTA produced different versions of the agreement, mainly related to
determining Mexico’s status as a surplus producer and the quota size for duty-free imports
(Kornis, 2001).
Another problem under dispute is U.S. access to the Mexican HFCS market.  Since 1998,
Mexican authorities imposed antidumping duties on U.S. HFCS.  In 2002, the duties were
replaced by a 20 percent tax on products used to produce soft drinks.  Additionally, a 20 percent
tax on services related to the distribution of syrups was imposed (U.S. Office of the Trade
Representative, 2005).
Sugar production in the United States during the 1989-2004 period increased by 27 percent. 
Total production in 1989 was 6.1 million MT and increased to 7.7 million MT in 2004.  During
the same period, sugar imports declined from 2.4 million MT in 1989 to 1.5 million MT in 2004,
representing a decrease of about 37 percent.  Exports of refined sugar decreased from
584,000 MT in 1989 to 181,000 MT in 2004 (69 percent).  Domestic consumption of sugar
increased by 15 percent since 1989 (from 7.8 million MT to 9.0 million MT) (ERS-USDA,
PS&D Tables).
Australia
Since 1997, Australian sugar prices have been based on world market prices with no government
intervention (Queensland Sugar Corporation, 1997).  However, the government recently decided
to assist the sugar industry by providing income support to producers, interest rates subsidies,
and assistance packages for diversification (ERS-USDA, 2003).
Brazil
The Brazilian government influences the sugar industry through its ethanol policy program. 
These policies have substantially influenced the growth of Brazilian sugar production and
exports (Mitchell, 2004).  In April 2003, the blend ratio (anhydrous-ethanol to gasoline blend)
was set at 20 percent; it was increased to 25 percent in July 2003 (Koizumi, 2003).  As a result of
this policy, only about 50 percent of sugar cane is used to produce sugar and the rest is used to
produce ethanol for automobile use (ERS-USDA, 2003; Mitchell, 2004; Koizumi, 2003).
India
The Indian sugar industry is protected with price supports, levies, and 60 percent import duties
(Mitchell, 2004).  Imports are also restricted by levy requirements and market release quotas. 
The government sets a minimum price for sugar cane; in addition to this price, the state
administration can increase the support price by 20-50 percent (ERS-USDA, 2003).  India also
provides internal freight reimbursement and an ocean freight subsidy to increase exports when
stocks of sugar accumulate (ERS-USDA, 2003).
Mexico
The Mexican government protects the sugar industry through price controls and import tariffs
(Mitchell, 2004).  Additionally, the government protects the industry by a system of market8
allotments.  Estimates of production and demand are computed, and then the government assigns
the NAFTA duty free and the non-duty free NAFTA export quota among the mills.  Any
production over the allocations is stored, sold for non-food use, or exported (Knapp, 2004).
Thailand
The government of Thailand implements a protectionist agenda similar to that of the EU.  There
is a three quota system in which quota-A is for sugar used in domestic consumption, quota-B is
to meet export commitments, and quota-C is for export sales (ERS-USDA, 2003).  The
government also uses credit and tax incentives to promote sugar exports.
The Doha Agenda
The DDA was launched in November 2001, with strong leadership by the United States.  The
agenda covers six broad areas, including agriculture, non-agricultural market access, services,
the Singapore issues (transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, investment,
and competition), rules (trade remedies), and development-related issues (U.S. Office of Trade
Representatives, 2004).  The DDA is the largest negotiation of this type in history, covering
items such as cars, agricultural products, communication services, and custom rules.  In the
agenda, the United States proposed the following:
1.  eliminate agricultural export subsidies;
2.  decrease levels of trade-distorting domestic support; and
3.  increase real market access opportunities in developed and developing countries
through tariff cuts and quota expansion (U.S. Office of Trade Representatives, 2004;
WTO 2004).
Tariffs will be cut using a tiered formula that will lead to greater harmonization in tariff levels
across countries.  Substantial improvement in market access will be applied to all agricultural
products, including sensitive products.  Countries will be able to designate a specific number of
sensitive products that will be handled through a combination of tariff quota expansion and tariff
reductions to expand market access (WTO, 2004).
The proposal aims for the elimination of export subsidies, export credits with repayment periods
beyond 180 days, and export guarantee programs.  Another key objective is the elimination of
trade distorting practices in sales by State Trading Enterprises (STE); thereby eliminating the
monopoly power of such entities.  The idea is that during the first year of implementation, each
member’s total permitted trade-distorting support will be cut by 20 percent from current levels
(U.S. Office of Trade Representatives, 2004; WTO, 2004).9
MODEL AND SCENARIOS
The simulation model developed by Benirschka et al. (1996) was used to estimate changes in
sugar production, consumption, and price.  The model includes 17 countries and regions:
Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the EU-25, South Africa, and Thailand as major exporters; and Algeria,
Canada, China, Indonesia, Egypt, India, Japan, Mexico, the Former Soviet Union, the United
States, and the Rest of the World region as major importers.  The model computes how
production, supply, demand, consumption, trade, and price react, within the United States and
the world, as variables in the system are changed.
Model Structure
Sugar supply or production (qpi,t) is estimated as the product of the area harvested and the yield
per hectare, where the area harvested (ai,t) is expressed as a function of expected prices of sugar
(pt-1), alternative crops (p
c
t-1), and policy parameters (gt):
ai,t = f (ai,t-1, pt-1, p
c
t-1, gt)( 1 )
Additionally, a lagged dependent variable (ai,t-1) is included to provide for dynamics related to
producers’ cropping decisions, and i indexes for cane sugar or beet sugar.  For each region, the
model calculates total consumption of sugar (qdt) as the product of per capita consumption and
population.  Per capita consumption (fdt) depends on the price of sugar (pt), per capita disposable
income (cyt), and a time trend variable (t) to provide for changes in tastes and preferences of
consumers:
fdt = g (pt, cyt, t). (2)
Carry-out stocks equations (qst) are calculated as a function of domestic production (qpt), price
(pt), and carry-in stocks (qst-1).  These stocks protect against unexpected reductions in
production, and therefore depend on the level of domestic production and the opportunity cost of
storing sugar (Koo, 2002):
qst = h (qst-1, qpt, pt). (3)
The sum of domestic production (qpt-1) and carry-in stocks (qst-1) represents domestic supply,
and the sum of domestic consumption (qdt) and carry-out stocks (qst) is total demand.  Net
exports (qxt) are then estimated as the difference between domestic supply and total demand, and
a market equilibrium condition is expressed as:








From this equilibrium condition, the equilibrium world price of sugar is calculated and expressed
as domestic price for each region using official exchange rates.  Finally, the sugar wholesale10
price in each region is computed as a function of the world market price in domestic currency
and expressed in real terms (Benirschka et al., 1996).
Base and Alternative Scenarios
A base and two alternative scenarios are developed to evaluate the impact of trade liberalization
policy alternatives on the U.S. industry and world price.  The base and alternative models are
presented as follows.
Base scenario.  The base-line case includes the expected sugar imports from the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 107,000 MT (Koo et al., 2003), and includes
implementation of NAFTA, but with limited imports from Mexico.  Average climate conditions
and historical rates of technological change are assumed.  Additionally, it is assumed that current
agricultural policies will be continued in all countries.  The price of sugar in all regions is
assumed to be endogenous; however, the price of other crops is exogenous.  Forecasted
exogenous prices were obtained from the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute
(FAPRI) World Agricultural Outlook (2005).  Assumptions of gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rates, interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation rates were also obtained from FAPRI
(2005).
Scenario 2.  This case assumes the EU partially liberalizes its sugar industry by implementing
some of the changes proposed in 2004, while the other countries maintain their current policy
programs.  Under this scenario, the price of refined sugar was reduced from € 632 to € 421
(758 to 505 U.S. dollars) per metric ton, production quota decreased from 17.4 million MT to
14.9 million, and new member countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) were treated as old members.
Scenario 3.  Under this scenario, the EU, China, Japan, and the United States partially liberalize
their sugar industries under the current WTO-Doha Development Agenda.  Variations in the
model include the proposed changes from the EU included in scenario 2, plus a 20 percent cut in
tariffs and a 20 percent increase in import quotas from China, Japan, and the United States. 
Policies in all other countries were assumed to remain constant, with limited U.S. sugar imports
from Mexico.
IMPACT ON THE U.S. SUGAR INDUSTRY AND WORLD PRICE
Table 1 presents the results of the simulation model under the base and alternative scenarios for
the United States and the Caribbean sugar price, which is a reference for the world price.  In
2004, U.S. sugar production was 4.4 and 4.1 million short tons (ST) from beet sugar and cane
sugar, respectively.  Total consumption was 9.9  million ST and net imports accounted for
1.4 million ST.  Prices in 2004 were 40 and 27 dollars per ST of sugar beets and sugar cane,
respectively, while the wholesale sugar price was 26.15 cents per pound.  The Caribbean price
was 8.4 cents per pound in 2004.1 The reduction in the wholesale sugar price was expected as additional sugar is suplied from
increased imports and production.  Although the increase in sugar beets and sugar cane prices is
marginal, the direction of this change was not expected.  This result can be explainned as an
effect of increased efficiency of U.S. sugar processing plants during the last years.  Regardless of
the wholesale sugar price, sugar beets and sugar cane prices have remained stable or slightly
increasing, mainly as a consequence of lower operating cost in sugar plants.
11
Table 1.  Sugar Price, Production, Consumption, and Net Imports Under the Base and Alternative
Scenarios in the United States










Beet Sugar Production 1,000 ST 
a 4358 4683 4685 4636
Cane Sugar Production 1,000 ST 4120 4367 4369 4333
Total Consumption 1,000 ST 9905 10703 10716 10803
Net Imports 1,000 ST 1429 1670 1670 1927
Sugar Beets Price Dollars/ST 40 40.34 40.15 38.96
Sugar Cane Price Dollars/ST 27 27.73 27.56 26.43
Wholesale Sugar Price Cents per Lb 26.15 24.89 24.74 23.79
World Caribbean U.S. Cents per Lb 8.4 8.7 9.96  12.1
a ST = short tons
For the year 2013, the base scenario projects an increase in beet sugar and cane sugar production
of 7.5 and 6 percent, respectively.  Production is estimated at 4.7 million ST for beet sugar and
4.4 million ST for cane sugar.  Net imports are expected to be 1.7 million ST, which represent an
increase of 17 percent when compared to levels in 2004.  As more sugar is available in the U.S.
market, the model also projects the total volume of sugar consumption will be 10.7 million ST,
an 8.1 percent increase.  Sugar beets and sugar cane prices are expected to increase by 1 and
3 percent, respectively; however, the wholesale sugar price in the United States is expected to be
24.89 cents per pound, 5 percent lower than the 2004 level.
1  The Caribbean sugar price from the
base scenario in 2013 is expected to be slightly higher (3.6 percent) than the price in 2004.
Limited Liberalization of the Sugar Industry under the EU Proposal (Scenario 2)
In this scenario, the EU reduces the intervention price of sugar from 758 to 505 U.S. dollars per
metric ton, and production quota falls from 17.4 million MT to 14.9 million MT.  Table 1 shows
that U.S. beet and cane sugar production are projected to increase, but only by about 0.1 percent
when compared to the base-line scenario.  Consumption will increase by only 0.1 percent, and
net imports will remain at the same level of the base line scenario.  Prices in the United States
will decrease to 40.15 dollars per ST for sugar beets and to 27.56 dollars for sugar cane,12
representing a decrease of 0.5 and 0.6 percent, respectively.  Also, the wholesale sugar price in
the United States is projected to decrease by 0.6 percent to 24.74 cents per pound.  By contrast,
the world price is expected to increase about 14.5 percent, from 8.7 cents to 9.96 cents per
pound, mainly because the proposal will reduce EU sugar exports while the world demand
remains unchanged.
In general, results from this scenario suggest that the proposed EU reform will increase
Caribbean price, but will not significantly affect the U.S. sugar industry.  Under this policy, it is
expected that sugar exports from the EU will decrease and consequently sugar imports will
increase.  Therefore, the world sugar market adjusts to these changes in the EU and the world
price becomes higher than the base-line scenario.
Limited Liberalization under WTO-Doha in Selected Countries (Scenario 3)
This scenario includes the proposed changes from the EU, plus a 20 percent reduction in sugar
tariffs and a 20 percent increase in import quotas from China, Japan, and the United States. 
However, U.S. imports from Mexico under NAFTA are limited.  When compared to the base-
line scenario, results from Table 1 show that beet and cane sugar production are expected to
decrease by 1.0 and 0.8 percent, respectively.  Total consumption is projected to increase by
about 0.9 percent.  However, freer trade policies will increase U.S. imports by 15.4 percent up to
a volume of 1.9 million ST.  Prices are expected to decrease to 38.96 and 26.43 dollars per ST
for sugar beets and sugar cane, respectively.  This change in price represents a reduction of
3.4 percent for sugar beets and 4.7 percent for sugar cane.  In addition, the wholesale sugar price
in the United States is expected to decrease by 4.4 percent, to 23.79 cents per pound.  Higher
sugar supply in the United States from increased imports, compared to a relatively small increase
in sugar consumption, will cause a reduction in the price of sugar.  In contrast, the world sugar
price is projected to increase to 12.1 cents per pound, a 39 percent increase over the base-line
scenario, because increased imports from consuming countries stimulate world demand for
sugar, while the supply of sugar remains unchanged.
The increase in the Caribbean price of sugar may stimulate some changes from major sugar
producing countries.  Table 2 presents changes in production, consumption, and trade in selected
countries under the WTO-Doha scenario.  Results indicate that Brazil will substantially increase
production and exports.  Total value of exports from Brazil, evaluated at 12.1 cents per pound,
will increase by about 2.9 billion U.S. dollars.  For Thailand and Australia, export revenues will
increase by 0.46 and 0.31 billion U.S. dollars, respectively.  The EU, India, and China are
expected to increase imports significantly, while Japan and the United States are likely to have
moderate increases in imports.
Although some countries (low cost sugar producers) will benefit from a higher world sugar
price, other producers could be seriously affected, as sugar traded under preferential agreements
with the EU and the United States will be valued at a lower price.13









Base Scenario WTO-Doha Base Scenario WTO-Doha Base Scenario WTO-Doha
Australia 5391 5430 1337 1336 4054 4093
Brazil 33039 38089 11582 11582 21458 26509
China 10706 10865 14371 15628 -3685 -4761
European Union 18834 15096 17526 17526 1293 -2444
India 21044 21165 21693 25047 -684 -3939
Japan 892 795 2397 2518 -1503 -1721
Mexico 6239 6289 5824 5821 -405 -460
Thailand 8237 8310 2332 2330 5888 5963
United States 8236 8162 9740 9831 -1520 -1754
a Negative values indicate net importers.
Welfare Effects
In order to evaluate the welfare effects, changes in consumer and producer surpluses were
estimated for the EU and the Doha scenarios.  Because of differences in the price elasticity of
supply between sugar beet and sugar cane producers (Koo, 2002; Benirshka et al., 1996),
producer surpluses for sugar beet and cane are presented in Table 3.
Both of the scenarios resulted in a reduction in the wholesale sugar price and a consequent
reduction in the prices of sugar beets and sugar cane.  From this outcome, it is expected that
consumer surplus increases, while the opposite occurs for producer surplus (Table 3).  When
compared to the base-line scenario, the value of consumer surplus increases by 4.1 million
dollars for the EU scenario and by 30.9 million dollars for the Doha scenario.  In contrast, the
value of producer surplus decreases by 1.6 and 12.1 million dollars for the EU and Doha
scenarios, respectively.  The total welfare change in both scenarios is positive: 2.7 million
dollars for the EU scenario and 18.9 million dollars for the Doha scenario.  The effect of the
WTO-Doha scenario is significantly larger than that of the EU scenario.14
Table 3.  Changes in Consumer and Producer Surplus in the United States
from the Base Scenario to the EU and Doha Scenarios




Consumer Surplus 4066 30916
Producer Surplus -1632 -12072
Beet Producer -890 -6421
Cane Producer -742 -5651
Total Change 2704 18844
Under these circumstances, reductions in sugar production are very likely to occur in the United
States and production of sugar-competing crops could increase as some land is removed from
sugar production.  However, the effect of changes in the production of competing products is
expected to be very small (Koo, 2002).
In terms of the sugar program, the reaction by the U.S. government to provide for the loses in
producer surplus under the WTO-Doha scenario is unknown.  One alternative could be to reduce
allotments of sugar production in order to maintain domestic sugar prices at a desirable level. 
Another alternative is to assist the sugar industry by providing income support to producers or
assistance packages for diversification.
CONCLUSION
In April 2005, the WTO-appellate body decided to uphold the decision made in August 2004,
which ruled the EU sugar exports were illegally subsidized.  Before this initial decision, in
July 2004, the EU proposed the reform of its sugar policy, which is expected to be published in
June 2005.  The changes are intended to increase the competitiveness of the sugar sector and will
frame the EU position for the WTO-DDA negotiations in Hong Kong in December 2005.  The
reform includes a significant reduction of the intervention sugar price and reduction in the
production quota (Kelch and Normile, 2004; European Commission, 2004 (a)).  Additionally,
under the WTO-DDA, substantial improvement in market access is being discussed for all
agricultural products, including sugar.  The framework calls for the elimination of export
subsidies, export credits with repayment periods beyond 180 days, and export guarantee
programs (U.S. Office of Trade Representatives, 2004; WTO, 2004).  This study utilizes a
simulation model (Benirschka et al., 1996) to analyze the potential reforms of the EU and some
liberalization policies under the Doha agenda proposal in order to evaluate their impact on the
U.S. sugar price and the consequences on producers and consumers.  Results from these
alternative policies are compared to those from a base-line scenario.
For the base-line scenario (scenario 1), it is assumed that current agricultural policies will be
continued in all countries.  Projections for the year 2013 indicate an increase in the production of
beet sugar and cane sugar production by 7.5 and 6 percent, respectively.  Net sugar imports will
increase by 17 percent, and consumption is also expected to increase by 8.1 percent. 
Consequently, the U.S. wholesale sugar price is expected to decrease by 5 percent.15
Under scenario 2, the EU reduces the intervention price of sugar from 758 to 505 U.S. dollars
per metric ton, and the production quota is decreased from 17.4 million MT to 14.9 million MT. 
In general, results from the model indicate that if these reforms are implemented by the EU, the
Caribbean sugar price will grow from 8.7 to 9.96 cents per pound, a 14.5 percent increase, but
the changes will have little effect in the U.S. sugar industry.
The WTO-Doha scenario (scenario 3) includes sugar policy reforms in the EU plus a 20 percent
cut in import tariffs and a 20 percent increase in import quota in China, Japan, and the United
States.  Under these circumstances, U.S. sugar imports will increase by 15.4 percent; however,
sugar production is not expected to be significantly affected.  Sugar beet and sugar cane prices
are projected to decrease by 3.4 and 4.7 percent, respectively.  Also, the U.S. wholesale sugar
price will decrease by 4.4 percent to 23.79 cents per pound.  In contrast, the world sugar price is
projected to increase to 12.1 cents per pound, a 39 percent increase.
U.S. consumer and producer surplus changes were estimated for the EU and the WTO- Doha
scenarios.  The total welfare change in both cases is positive; however, the effect is significantly
larger for the Doha case.  Implementation of the Doha scenario may increase social welfare in
the United States, but because of reduced prices, the policy may affect some U.S. producers.
With a higher Caribbean price under the Doha scenario, Brazil will benefit most, as production
and export sales increase.  Thailand and Australia are also expected to experience moderate
increases in production and exports.  The EU, India, and China are expected to increase imports
substantially.  The United States and Japan will increase imports moderately.17
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